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THE PRESS IS DIFFERENT:
REFLECTIONS ON JUSTICE STEWART AND
THE AUTONOMOUS PRESS
Floyd Abrams*
Question: "And I suppose your argument, based as it is upon the First
Amendment, could not logically be confined to newsmen, however defined. I suppose everyone of us has the--is protected
in his right to free speech and the right to speak also includes
the right to keep silent. And I suppose, logically carried to its
conclusion, your argument would be that anybody would be
protected if he just said, 'I don't want to talk.'"
Answer: "Well, I wouldn't know-"
Question: "Why is it confined to newsmen? We all have the right of free
speech, do we not?"'1
Question: "Is there any reason to think that if it is so as to the press, it's
different as to freedom of expression?"
Answer: "As a general matter, your Honor, it seems to me that this
case could be decided as a freedom-of-expression case without
necessarily relying on the press clause itself. 2
Question: "Well, do you suggest the privilege of a reporter is different
from the privilege of some other witness?"
Answer: "Well, it seems to me, your Honor, that--this will take a moment or two .... "

But it takes more than a moment or two. The question occurs
and recurs; it is rarely responded to directly by counsel and has
yet to be ruled upon directly by the Court. My own answer is that
* Member, Cahill Gordon & Reindel; Visiting Lecturer, Yale Law. School. B.A.,
1956, Cornell University; LL.B., 1960, Yale Law School. The author has represented
journalists, newspapers, and broadcasters in various cases referred to in this Article.
1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)
(colloquy of Justice Stewart with counsel).
2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (colloquy of Justice White with counsel).
3. Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Herbert v. Lando, 99 S.Ct. 1635 (1979)
(colloquy of Chief Justice Burger with counsel).
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the press is "different" from "everyone"; that it is, in a variety of circumstances, entitled to constitutional treatment distinct from that

generally afforded those who exercise their freedom of expression;
and that the nature of the treatment should largely be as urged in
the provocative articulations of Justice Potter Stewart.
At the

JUSTICE STEWART AND TIE PRESS
core of these views, expressed on 4 and

offO the bench,

are two governing concepts. The first is that the press clause of the

first amendment8 explicitly and purposively provides protection for
the press that is independent from that provided others under the
speech clause. The second is that the quintessential characteristic7
of the press requiring constitutional protection is its autonomy

from government. Justice Stewart's views are set forth most notably in his brief but seminal lecture given at the Yale Law School in
1974.8 The press clause of the first amendment, Justice Stewart ar4. In addition to cases discussed substantively in this Article, the reader is
referred to the following opinions of Justice Stewart involving the press. Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 570 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532, 601 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). Garland, in particular, should be contrasted with
Justice Stewart's subsequent opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725
(1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Other first amendment opinions of Justice Stewart
which should be examined include obscenity and related rulings in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 84 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Mishkin v.
New York, 383 U.S. 502, 518 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Ginzburg v. United
States, 383 U.S. 463, 497 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of
the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959). Significant libel opinions of Justice Stewart
include Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S.
265 (1971); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 91 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart joined in Justice Powell's majority opinion in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and in Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Time, Inc.
v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). Justice Stewart dissented from the Supreme Court
ruling in Herbert v. Lando, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 1661 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
5. See note 8 infra and accompanying text.
6. The first amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ......
U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
7. Autonomy is generally defined as "the quality or state of being independent,
free and self-directing." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 148

(1976). Although Justice Stewart has not himself offered a definition of the word, the
dictionary definition is a serviceable one-one which well describes the quality of
the press Justice Stewart believes most requires first amendment protection.
8. Address by Justice Stewart, Yale Law School (Nov. 2, 1974), reprinted, except for opening courtesies, in Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631
(1975).
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gued, is "in essence a structural provision [which] . . . extends
protection to an institution," the "publishing business." 9 The press
clause, Justice Stewart urged, is not designed solely to ensure that
newspapers serve as neutral forums for debate or neutral conduits
of information between the people and their leaders. What the
clause protects is the "institutional autonomy of the press." It does
this by creating "a fourth institution outside the Government as an
additional check on the three official branches."1 0
After analyzing a variety of first amendment cases decided by
the Court, Justice Stewart concluded his Yale lecture by articulating a view which he would later reiterate in his judicial opinions:
"So far as the Constitution goes, the autonomous press may publish
what it knows, and may seek to learn what it can."1 1
But Justice Stewart is acutely aware that the autonomy he
finds built into the first amendment necessarily cuts both ways.
While the press is "free to do battle against secrecy and deception
in government," it
cannot expect from the Constitution any guarantee that it will
succeed. There is no constitutional right to have access to particular government information, or to require openness from the
bureaucracy. The public's interest in knowing about its government is protected by the guarantee of a Free Press, but the protection is indirect. The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom
12
of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act.
Justice Stewart's judicial opinions, both before and after the Yale
address, have consistently echoed similar themes. Three cases are
illustrative. When the Supreme Court in Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations'3 upheld by a five-tofour vote the constitutionality of a Pittsburgh statute barring newspapers from publishing sex-designated employment columns, Justice Stewart (joined by Justice Douglas) 14 dissented in the strongest
9.

Stewart, supra note 8, at 633 (emphasis in original).

10. Id. at 634.
11. Id. at 636.
12. Id. (footnote omitted).
13. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
14. 413 U.S. at 400 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart's views in first
amendment cases involving the press have been closer to those of Justice Douglas
than to any member of the current Court; they were far less often joined in non-first
amendment opinions. In fact, the two members of the Court with whom Justice
Stewart joined least in his first eight years on the bench were Justices Douglas and
Black; in each of the remaining five years these two Justices remained on the Court,
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language. In its final application of the later-rejected rule that commercial speech is not entitled to any first amendment protection, 15
the majority held that since discrimination in employment is "not
only commercial activity . . . [but] illegal commercial activity";16

publication of advertisements for employment in sex-designated
columns could constitutionally be barred. The Stewart dissent
urged that the question is a far different one: "whether any government agency ...

can tell a newspaper in advance what it can print

and what it cannot."' 7 The correct answer, Justice Stewart urged,
is that the first amendment is "a clear command that government
must never be allowed to lay its heavy editorial hand on any newspaper in this country."' 18
Justice Stewart joined in opinions with one or the other of them less often than with
any other member of the Court; subsequent to Justice Black's retirement at the end
of the 1970 Term, and through 1975, Justice Stewart was found least in the judicial
company of Justice Douglas; and in the 1976 Term (after Justice Douglas' retirement) he was found least in the company of Justices Brennan and Marshall. The
members of the Court with whom he has most often found himself in agreement
have varied through the years; in the last three years, it has been Justices Powell
and Rehnquist. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 70, 296
(1977); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 56, 277 (1976); The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 Htv. L. REV. 47, 276 (1975); The Supreme Court, 1973
Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 41, 275 (1974); The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 55, 304 (1973); The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REV. 50, 301
(1972); The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 38, 351 (1971); The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. REV. 30, 252 (1970); The Supreme Court, 1968
Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 60, 279 (1969); The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L.
REv. 93, 307 (1968); The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 110, 131
(1967); The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REV. 123, 145 (1966); The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARv. L. REV. 103, 109 (1965); The Supreme Court,
1963 Term, 78 HA~iv. L. REv. 177, 183 (1964); The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77
HARV. L. REV. 79, 87'11963); The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76 HARV. L. REV. 75,
85 (1962); The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. REV. 80, 89 (1961); The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74 HARV. L. REV. 95, 105 (1960); The Supreme Court, 1958
Term, 73 HARV. L. REV. 126, 133 (1959).
All of this, I hasten to add, proves nothing other than that statistically based efforts to predict votes of members of the Court are-fortunately-fruitless. For a
sampling of such efforts, see, e.g., G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND (1965); G.
SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED (1974).

15. See Valentine v. Chrestenson, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). First amendment protection has been extended to commercial speech in, inter alia, the following cases:
Bates v. State Bar, 433 LU.S. 350 (1977); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977); Linmark Assocs, v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). But ef. Friedman v. Rogers, 99 S. Ct. 887
(1979) (no first amendment right to use trade name).
16. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
at 388 (emphasis in original).
17. Id. at 400 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 403-04 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stewart's views on the need for editorial autonomy of
the electronic media have been expressed with similar force. In
CBS v. Democratic National Committee,' 9 Justice Stewart agreed
with the Court's rejection of the court of appeals' holding that the
first amendment requires broadcasters to carry editorial advertisements against their will. In a tartly phrased concurring opinion, he
observed that the ad hoc balancing of first amendment "values" engaged in by the lower court would permit "such governmental controls upon the press as a majority of [the] Court at any particular
moment might consider First Amendment 'values' to require." 20
This "frightening specter," 2 1 Justice Stewart argued, is a direct
consequence of the apparent willingness of the court of appeals to
"lose sight of the First Amendment itself, and march forth in blind
pursuit of its 'values.' "22 Justice Stewart concluded that even if the
question were one of first amendment "values" alone, those values
"should mean at least this: If we must choose whether editorial
decisions are made in the free judgment of individual broadcasters, or
23
imposed by bureaucratic fiat, the choice must be for freedom."
Justice Stewart's views are further explicated in his brief con4
curring opinion in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia.2
In Landmark the Court held that third persons, including, but not
limited to, the press, cannot be criminally punished "for divulging
or publishing truthful information regarding confidential proceed'
ings of the [Virginia] Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission. "25
Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment but agreed with the
Court's holding only as to the press. As regards all others, Justice
Stewart urged that punishment is constitutionally permissible. As
to the press, Justice Stewart stated:
If the constitutional protection of a free press means anything, it
means that government cannot take it upon itself to decide what
a newspaper may and may not publish. Though government may
deny access to information and punish its theft, government may
not prohibit or punish the publication of that information once it
falls into the hands of the press ....26
19.

412 U.S. 94 (1973).

20. Id. at 133 (Stewart, J., concurring).
21. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 145 (Stewart, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 146 (Stewart, J., concurring).
24. 435 U.S. 829, 848 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring). For further explication of
the case, see text accompanying notes 147-149 infra.

25. 435 U.S. at 837 (footnote omitted).
26. Id. at 849 (Stewart, J., concurring). See also Stewart, supra note 8, at 635-36.
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As his Yale speech suggests and his Landmark concurrence
urges, the price to be paid by the press for the autonomy Justice
Stewart believes it is constitutionally guaranteed is high. Just as
first amendment "values" are not to be balanced against the independence of the press, neither would Justice Stewart permit first
amendment values to be balanced for the press in a manner that
might compromise its independence. Thus, in two companion
prison-access cases, Justice Stewart wrote strongly worded opinions
27
for the Court rejecting the press' position. In Fell v. Procunier
and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 28 members of the press and

prison inmates challenged the constitutionality of rules prohibiting
interviews between journalists and designated inmates. Emphasizing that one important function of a corrections system is to deter
crime through such sanctions as isolation, 29 and recognizing the existence of mail and visitation rights that permit indirect access to
the press, 30 the Court held that the first amendment rights of the
inmates and the press are not violated by the rules. Justice
Stewart's majority opinion in Pell noted that both the press and the
public are "accorded full opportunities to observe prison conditions" 3'

and that the purpose of the rules is not to hinder the

"press' investigation and reporting of those conditions."32 More
broadly, both opinions emphasized that "newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public" 3 3 and the Constitution does not impose

upon "government the affirmative duty to make available to journalists sources of information not available to members of the pub34
lic generally."
Still more striking is Justice Stewart's critical concurring opinion in Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 35 The Ninth Circuit upheld a district court injunction that restrained the sheriff of Alameda County
from restricting public and press access to a prison to a once-amonth guided tour of portions of the jail. Neither the public nor
27. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
28. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
29. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 822-23. See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
417 U.S. at 849.

30. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 847-48; Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. at 824-25.
31. 417 U.S. at 830 (footnote omitted).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 834, quoted in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 850.

34. Id., quoted in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 850.
35.

438 U.S. 1 (1978).
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press were permitted access to the "Greystone" portion of the jail
where illness and suicide had reportedly occurred. The court of appeals found such restrictions to be an unconstitutional infringement
of first and fourteenth amendment rights. 36
The Supreme Court reversal by a three (Burger, White;
37
Rehnquist) -to-one (Stewart) -to-three (Stevens, Brennan, Powell)
decision acknowledged the public interest in jail conditions and the
media's role in providing information. 3 8 Chief Justice Burger's
opinion for the Court, however, held that there is no basis for
reading into the Constitution a right to enter penal institutions,
gather information, and take pictures for broadcast purposes in a
manner not accorded the general public. 39 "We must not confuse
the role of the media," the Chief Justice wrote, "with that of government; each has special, crucial functions, each complementing-and sometimes conflicting with-the other." 40 Chief Justice
Burger further observed that "the government cannot restrain communication of whatever information the media acquires-and which
41
they elect to reveal."
Justice Stewart's brief and critical concurring opinion 42 reiterated his view that "[tihe First and Fourteenth Amendments do not
guarantee the public a right of access to information generated or controlled by government, nor do they guarantee the press any basic
right of access superior to that of the public generally." 43 However, since some access had been provided the public, Justice
Stewart concluded that press access, as well, should be afforded
and that such access, although more limited than that granted by
the district court, must be made effective. "[Tlerms of access,"
Justice Stewart concluded, "that are reasonably imposed on individual members of the public may, if they impede effective report36. KQED, Inc. v. Houchins, 546 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 438 U.S. 1
(1978).
37. Since Justices Marshall and Blackmun did not participate in the Houchins
ruling, it should be recalled that Justice Marshall has consistently voted with those
members of the Court supporting some form of first amendment right of the press to
gather news. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 836 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725
(1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.). If, as may be
predicted, Justice Marshall adheres to his previously expressed positions, Justice
Stewart's views in the area will remain of determinative import.
38. 438 U.S. at 8.
39. Id. at 8-11.
40. Id. at 8-9.
41. Id. at 10.
42. Id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
43. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
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ing without sufficient justification, be unreasonable as applied to
journalists who are there to convey to the general public what the
44
visitors see."
THE PRESS CLAUSE DEBATE: AN INTRODUCTION

The articulation of Justice Stewart's views has led, in the
main, to an academic 45 and judicial46 debate as to whether the
press is entitled to "more" first amendment protection than
others-be they speakers, academics, or back-fence gossipers. In a
sense, this issue is raised by Justice Stewart's views. But it is
hardly the fairest way to phrase the question. 47 The basic question
to be addressed may be stated in a far simpler and more neutral
manner: Is the press, however defined, entitled to any different
treatment because it is the "press"?
Until recently, this question would not have seemed even a
troublesome one, so self-evident has it seemed that whichever
clause of the first amendment applies, the press is entitled to a significant degree of protection specially designed for it. If this were
not so, if each "press" case must be a "speech" case as well,
reexamination would be required of more than a few Supreme
Court rulings. There has surely been no lack of Supreme Court
language about the unique role played by the press in American
life. It has, for example, been said that it is the press' special function to serve as a "mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in
governmental affairs, exposing corruption among public officers and
employees"; 48 to function as a "powerful antidote to any abuses of
power by governmental officials"; 4 9 and to guard "against the mis44. Id. at 17 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
45. Particularly interesting articles, related to some or all of Justice Stewart's
submissions, are: Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REv. 731
(1977); Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FoUNDATION RESEARCH J. 521; Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 77 (1975); and Nimmer, Introduction-IsFreedom of the Press A Redundancy:
What Does it Add To Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975).
46. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
47. One would, for example, hardly commence a discussion of academic or religious freedom by asking whether academics or clergymen are entitled to "more"
rights than others; the question would be whether, and to what extent, they are entitled to any distinct constitutional treatment. The difference is more than one of rhetoric.
48. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
49. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966).
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carriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judi-

cial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism." 50
Even in so significant a press defeat as Pittsburgh Press,5 1 the
majority approvingly quoted from Justice Black's observation in the
Pentagon Papers Case5 2 that " '[i]n the First Amendment the
Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have

to fulfill its essential role in our democracy.'

"53

The majority in

Pittsburgh Press then acknowledged "the narrowness of the recog-

nized exceptions to the principle that the press may not be regu54

lated by the Government."
And, in what may be the two greatest press victories of the
1970's, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo55 and CBS v.
Democratic National Committee5 6-- both, not incidentally, written
by Chief Justice Burger 5 7 -there is soaring language about the
need for press independence and autonomy, as if all would agree
that there is some identifiable entity called the press that serves
significant societal functions and receives constitutional protection
to enable it to perform these functions.
50. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
51. See text accompanying notes 13-18 supra.
52. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
53. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
at 381-82 (quoting New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 717 (Black, J.,
concurring)).
54. Id. at 382.
55. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
56. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). See text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
57. As I have suggested elsewhere, see Abrams, The Press, Privacy, and the
Constitution, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1977, § 6 (Magazine), at 11, 65, Chief Justice
Burger has been far more supportive of legal positions of the press than has been
generally recognized. Chief Justice Burger's opinions in Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
CBS, 412 U.S. at 120, and even Houchins, 438 U.S. at 13-14, contain language which,
as much as any that has emanated from the Court, recognizes the most sweeping authority of the press to make its own editorial decisions. In CBS, for example, the
Chief Justice states:
For better or worse, editing is what editors are for; and editing is selection
and choice of material. That editors-newspaper or broadcast--can and do
abuse this power is beyond doubt, but . . . [clalculated risks of abuse are
taken in order to preserve higher values. The presence of these risks is nothing new; the authors of the Bill of Rights accepted the reality 1that these
risks were evils for which there was no acceptable remedy other than a
spirit of moderation and a sense of responsibility-and civility-on the part
of those who exercise the guaranteed freedoms of expression.
412 U.S. at 124-25. Whatever the accuracy of the repeated reports about Chief Justice
Burger's off-the-bench views of the press, and notwithstanding that the Chief Justice
has hardly been a consistent supporter of press positions in the Supreme Court, he
remains entitled to considerably more recognition from the press for opinions authored by him.
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One may look back to Grosjean v. American Press Co. 5e
through Mills v. Alabama,59 the Pentagon Papers Case,60 and
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart.6 1 It could not have been seriously argued in any of these cases that it was not relevant, not
significant, and perhaps not central that the challenged governmental conduct would have silenced, stifled, or suppressed the press.
What then is the argument about? And why the intensity of it
all? Why, for example, this Symposium on this particular facet of
Justice Stewart's score of productive and often luminous years on
the Supreme Court?
There are undoubtedly troublesome, if not debatable, points
raised by Justice Stewart's views. Among them are his historical interpretation of the adoption of the first amendment,6 2 the painful
difficulty of defining "press," and the nature of press autonomy
which Justice Stewart believes is constitutionally protected.
These are difficult questions, ones I attempt to deal with elsewhere in this Article. But I doubt they even begin to explain why
Justice Stewart's Yale speech and judicial opinions have provoked
such widespread attention and opposition. The reason, I would
suggest, is far different-and far simpler. It is that, to some, Justice Stewart's views are not simply unpersuasive but, in some fashion, threatening. That this should be the reaction of those who see
the press as excessively powerful, uncomfortably "adversary," 6 3 or
who feel personally aggrieved by press treatment is hardly surprising. Those who routinely condemn the press as, for example, "the
judge, jury and prosecutor, not merely the recorder of human

58. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
59. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
60. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
61. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
62. See, e.g., k-ouchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. at 17 (Stewart, J., concurring in
judgment); Stewart, supra note 8, at 633-35.
63. Perhaps the best definition of the "adversary" press is that of Tom Wicker:
I assert the necessity to encourage the developing tendency of the press to
shake off the encumbrance of a falsely objective journalism and to take an
adversary position toward the most powerful institutions of American life.
By "adversary," I don't mean a necessarily hostile position; I use the
word in the lawyer's sense of cross-examining, testing, challenging, in the
course of a trial on the merits of a case. Such an adversary is "opposed" only
in the sense that he or she demands that a case be made-the law stated, the
facts proven, the assumptions and conclusions justified, the procedure
squared with common sense and good practice. An adversary press would
hold truth-unattainable and frequently plural as it is-as its highest value,
and knowledge as its first responsibility.
T. WICKER, ON PRESS 259-60 (1978) (emphasis in original).
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events," 6 4 are unlikely to cheer a view of press performance which
itself celebrates much of the reporting of the last ten years .65
What is less predictable-and far more interesting-is the intensely adverse response of some within the press itself, a response
most consistently voiced in the columns of Anthony Lewis. Lewis,
the Pulitzer Prize winning author of Gideon's Trumpet6 6 and
former Supreme Court correspondent of the New York Times, has
consistently opposed the notion that the press has any special constitutional status.6 7 The reaction of the press to the Supreme Court
ruling in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily68 approving police searches of
newsrooms, Lewis wrote, was "unjustifiably hysterical ' 69 and Justice Stewart's dissent "labored and unconvincing. "' 70 Press pleas for
legal protection of confidential sources are, according to Lewis,
merely the "current American press mystique." 71 More broadly,
Lewis has sternly admonished the press that it is a "fundamental
mistake" to argue for "different and better treatment under the
Constitution." 72 "The press," Lewis has written, "does itself no
' 73
good when it claims special privilege under the Constitution."
Lewis' disagreement with Justice Stewart's opinions should, of
course, be evaluated on their legal, historical, and policy merits.
To some extent, my views and those of Lewis concerning such
matters are set forth in this Symposium and the reader may decide
between them. But there is a disturbing tone worthy of special
comment in more than one of Lewis' columns: the tone epitomized
by Lewis' contention that it does the press "no good"74 to seek distinct legal protection under the first amendment. To the extent
64. The phrase is that of John Connally, quoted in J. HOIENBERG, A CRisis
FOR THE AMEIuCAN PRESs 19 (1978). Connally, who has fared well by the jury system, should surely know better where the ultimate power of judgment lies.
65. After noting that many have criticized the press as "arrogant and irresponsible," and that others are "deeply disturbed by what they consider to be the illegitimate power of the organized press in the political structure of our society," Justice
Stewart responded that "on the contrary, the established American press in the past
ten years .

Stewart,
66.
67.
(1979).
68.
text.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

.

. has performed precisely the function it was intended to perform."

supra note 8, at 631.
A. LEwis, GIDEON's TRUMPET (1964).
See Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism?, 7 HOFsTRA L. REv. 595
436 U.S. 547 (1978). See generally notes 122-124 infra and accompanying
Lewis,
Lewis,
Lewis,
Lewis,
Lewis,
Lewis,

Amending the Court, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1978, at A19, col. 5.
The Court and the Press, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1978, at A27, col. 1.
A Depressing Tale, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1978, at A21, col. 3.
supra note 70, at A27, col. 1.
supra note 69, at A19, col. 5.
supra note 69, at A19, col. 5 (emphasis added).
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Lewis' statement is simply a prediction of immediately forthcoming
judicial behavior-that the press lacks sufficient support on the Supreme Court to be afforded distinct protection-he may well be
correct. To the extent, however, that it is an argument that the
press should not seek "special" rights for fear the public will think
ill of a press that views itself as special, Lewis' position is far more
troubling. Not necessarily so in its assessment of the current public
mood, but dangerously so in its unwillingness to combat this mood.
For whatever else is true, the press will surely make no long-term
friends by being unwilling to defend its own constitutional role in
reporting the news to the public; and it will deceive no one except
itself by acting as if it believes that the public interest in news reporting is no different from-or no more significant than-the public interest in many other aspects of American life. By posing as
just another institution, all the press will assure is that it will be
treated like one.
THE PRESS CLAUSE:
AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

"[A] morsel of genuine history," Jefferson wrote to Adams, is
"a thing so rare as to be always valuable." 75 The historical events
which enveloped Jefferson, Adams, and their compatriots are at
least as contradictory and confusing as those in any period-no less
so with respect to the adoption of the first amendment. It is, as
Professor Emerson has observed, "by no means clear exactly what
the colonists had in mind, or just what they expected from the
guarantee of freedom of speech, press, assembly and petition."7 6
And, the truth, as Zechariah Chafee astutely observed, may well
be "that the framers had no very clear idea as to what they
meant. "7
But there are at least a few morsels of history from which
some conclusions may be drawn. There can be, for example, no
quarrel with Justice Stewart's observation that:
For centuries before our Revolution, the press in England
had been licensed, censored, and bedeviled by prosecutions for
seditious libel. The British Crown knew that a free press was not
75. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Sept. 8, 1817), reprintedin 2
THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS 519, 520 (L. Cappon ed. 1959).
76. -Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the First Amendment, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 737, 737 (1977).
77. Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARv. L. REV. 891, 898 (1949).
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just a neutral vehicle for the balanced discussion of diverse
ideas. Instead, the free press meant organized, expert scrutiny of
government. . . . This formidable check on official power was
what the British Crown had feared-and what the American
Founders decided to risk. 78
One may go further: Repressive measures familiar to preRevolutionary England and America went beyond direct censorship
and licensing of presses. From the introduction of the printing
press in England in the fifteenth century, the English government
had an astute understanding that the press functioned as an industrial and economic institution-as a business-and fashioned its
regulation accordingly. 7 9 Across the Atlantic, the American colonials learned that the press' ability to function could be grievously
impaired by regulation that does not, on its face, implicate the editorial process, for example, the infamous Stamp Act. These measures supplemented the familiar inquiries into the prepublication
process. 80
78. Stewart, supra note 8, at 634.
79. The legal history of the press in 16th- and 17th-century England is acutely
surveyed in W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1924). Holdsworth
demonstrates that from the inception of printing in England, the Crown recognized

the government's need to maintain strict control "over the printing, publication and
importation of books," to ensure the state's "peace and security." 5 id. at 208 (footnote
omitted). Jurisdiction over state control of printing was vested in the Star Chamber.
Id. Control also was effected initially through the Stationers' company, which was
granted inherent power by the Tudors to supervise and charge fees to individual
printers in exchange for helping the government suppress objectionable works. 6 id.
at 363-64. The Stationers were originally the book-purveyors who bought the printers' wares, "the capitalists upon whom the printers depended." Id. at 362-63 (footnote omitted). Patent monopolies were issued for the exclusive right of individual
printers to publish on particular subjects. Id. at 363. Thus while it was used to control and limit press autonomy, the earliest regulation of the press was economic.
80. Within the broad mandate of the press-regulating Stationers' company in
England were extraordinary powers of search and seizure in quest of unlicensed
presses, and the responsibility for "discovering the authors or printers of any obnoxious works that appeared." 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 79, at 364. The earliest
English news publications resulted in hostile official inquiry into the prepublication
process; but printers like Nicholas Bourne, Michael Sparke, and James Bowler resisted by refusing to reveal the authors or purchasers of works they printed. F.
SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND, 1476-1776, at 155 (1952). The same
tactic of forcing publishers to answer questions about the prepublication process was
used in colonial America. See, for example, the story of the New York trial in 1770 of
Alexander McDougall, who was identified as the author of an allegedly seditious
handbill by the handbill's printer, after the printer was threatened with imprisonment. The printer's name was in turn betrayed after the Governor of New York offered a £150 reward for the information. Levy, Introduction to FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON at xlii-xliii (L. Levy ed. 1966).
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Newspaper production in America was not as advanced as in
England; yet it was sufficiently developed by the time of the Revolution to refute any suggestion that the pre-Revolutionary journalistic press was inconsequential. The exhaustively researched study
by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., documents the vitality of the preRevolutionary press and its crucial role in the war.8 Schlesinger
surveys the array of forms of communication in pre-Revolutionary
America-songs, poems, pamphlets, religious sermons. He concludes:
Of these many ways of kneading men's minds none. however, equaled the newspapers. Published from New Hampshire
to Georgia, increasing in number with the rise of American opposition, issued with clocklike regularity and reaching every segment of society, they influenced events both by reporting and
abetting local patriot transactions and by broadcasting kindred
proceedings in other places. The press, that is to say, instigated,
catalyzed and synthesized the many other forms of propaganda
and action. It trumpeted the doings of Whig committees, publicized rallies and mobbings, promoted partisan fast days and
anniversaries, blazoned patriotic speeches and toasts, popularized anti-British slogans, gave wide currency to ballads and
broadsides, furthered the persecution of Tories, reprinted
London news of the government's intentions concerning America
and, in general, created an atmosphere of distrust and enmity
that made reconciliation increasingly difficult. Besides, the newspapers dispensed a greater volume of political
and constitutional
s2
argument than all the other media combined.
Schlesinger's conclusions, as well as other data,8 3 refute the contention that the eighteenth century was unfamiliar with the concept of an institutional, journalistically functioning, press-or its
84
central impact on American political and social life. s
Emphasis on the distinct role of the press is evident in the
adoption of the first amendment itself. As initially introduced by
James Madison in June 1789, what became the first amendment
stated: 'The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right
to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom
81. A. SCHLESINGER, PRELUDE TO INDEPENDENCE (1958).
82. Id. at 45-46 (emphasis added).
83. See F. SIEBERT, supra note 80. For further accounts of the vitality of preRevolutionary journalism in the American colonies, see C. DUNIWAY, THE DEvELOPMENT OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN MASSACHUSETTS (1906).

84. Contra, Lange, supra note 45, at 90 n.80. The colonial press "was neither
well-circulated nor widely-read." Id.
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of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable." 5 Madison simultaneously proposed an amendment that
"[n]o state shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases." 86 The
House of Representatives altered this second proposed amendment
by adding freedom of speech. The amendment as adopted by the
House was: "[N]o State shall infringe the equal rights of conscience, nor the freedom of speech or of the press, nor of the right
of trial by jury in criminal cases."8 7 Madison was said to consider
this "the most valuable amendment in the whole list." 8 8 The Senate would not, however, accept these restrictions on state powers.
The ensuing compromise produced the language presently em89
bodied in the first amendment.
In stating his opposition to the Alien and Sedition Laws, 90
Madison later emphasized the central role the inclusion of the
press clause of the first amendment had played in leading to ratification of the Constitution:
When the Constitution was under the discussions which
preceded its ratification, it is well known that great apprehensions were expressed by many, lest the omission of some positive exception, from the powers delegated, of certain rights, and
of the freedom of the press particularly, might expose them to
the danger of being drawn, by construction, within some of the
powers vested in Congress, more especially of the power to
make all laws necessary and proper for carrying their other powers into execution. In reply to this objection, it was invariably
urged to be a fundamental and characteristic principle of the
Constitution, that all powers not given by it were reserved; that
no powers were given beyond those enumerated in the Constitution, and such as were fairly incident to them: that the power
over the rights in question, and particularly over the press, was
neither among the enumerated powers, nor incident to any of
them; and consequently that an exercise of any such power
would be a manifest usurpation. It is painful to remark, how
much the arguments now employed in behalf of the Sedition Act
85. 1 ANNALS

OF CONG. 451 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789).
86. Id. at 452.
87. Id. at 783.
88. Id. at 784.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. I. This history, and further details and background to
the passage of the first amendment, are recounted in E. HUDON, FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND PRESS iN AMERICA (1963). See especially id. at 1-7.
90. Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1979

15

Hofstra Law
HOFSTRA
LAWReview,
REVIEWVol.

[Vol.
7, Iss. 3 [1979],
Art.7:2563

are at variance with the reasoning which then justified the Constitution, and invited its ratification.
From this posture of the subject resulted the interesting
question, in so many of the Conventions, whether the doubts
and dangers ascribed to the Constitution should be removed by
any amendments previous to the ratification, or be postponed in
confidence that, as far as they might be proper, they would be
introduced in the form provided by the Constitution. The latter
course was adopted; and in most of the States, ratifications were
followed by propositions and instructions for rendering the Constitution more explicit, and more safe to the rights not meant to
be delegated by it. Among those rights, the freedom of the
press, in most instances, is particularly and emphatically mentioned.9 '
Allowing for the hyperbole sometimes present in heated
discussions of current affairs, there is simply no basis for quarreling
with Madison's recollections. Virginia, for example, bad ratified the
Constitution with the express caveat that
no right of any denomination can be cancelled abridged restrained or modified by the Congress by the Senate or House of
Representatives acting in any Capacity by the President or any
Department or Officer of the United States except in those instances in which power is given by the Constitution for those
purposes: & that among other essential rights the liberty of Conscience and of the Press cannot be cancelled abridged
restrained
92
States.
United
the
of
authority
any
by
modified
or
In fact, of the original colonies, eleven had written constitutions; of these, nine had clauses in their constitutions protecting
against deprivations of the liberty of the press; only two-New
York and New Jersey-had constitutions which did not refer explicitly to freedom of the press.9 3 Of the eleven colonies with written
constitutions, however, only one-Pennsylvania-made any refer91. Report on the [Virginia] Resolutions [of 1798], reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 390-91 (G. Hunt ed. 1906) (emphasis added).
92. Virginia's Resolution of Ratification, reprinted in VIRGINIA COMM'N ON
CONSTITtrrIONAL GOVERNMENT, WE THE STATES 70, 71 (1964).
93. L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 184-85 (1960). Massachusetts' constitutional provision is illustrative: "'The Liberty of the press is essential to the security
of freedom in a state; it ought not, therefore, to be restricted in this commonwealth.'" Id. at 184 n.22. (quoting MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XVI). The history of
the ratification of the Massachusetts Constitution is set forth in C. DuNIWvAY, supra
note 83, at 133-36.
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ence to freedom of speech. 94 There were, as well, extended
discussions during the ratification process about the functions performed by the press and the particularized need for press freedom

so that those functions could be effectively performed. 95
Whatever other conclusions may be drawn-and disputes en-

gaged in-from the history of the adoption of the press clause of
the first amendment, one thing is clear: The press clause of the
first amendment was no afterthought, no mere appendage to the

speech clause. The press clause was not, the views of Chief Justice Burger to the contrary, merely "complementary to and a natu-

ral extension of Speech Clause liberty." 96 Whatever ambiguities
there may be about its meaning, the press clause was, at the very
least, a deeply felt response to the deprivations of press liberty that
the colonists had witnessed and to which they had been subjected.
That does not, to be sure, answer questions regarding the scope of

the press clause, let alone the definition of "press." But it does
demonstrate that as to one critical historical issue Justice Stewart
was correct: "That the First Amendment speaks separately of freedom of speech and freedom of the press is no constitutional accident, but an acknowledgement of the critical role played by the
97
press in American society."

To say this is not to denigrate the speech clause and all that it
94. L. LEVY, supra note 93, at 184. Pennsylvania's first constitution provided:
"That the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing, and publishing
their sentiments; therefore the freedom of the press ought not to be restrained." 5
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER OR-

LAWs 3083 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909). If one had to choose, based upon the language of the Pennsylvania Constitution alone, between the relative importance afforded freedom of speech and press, one would be hard put to choose the former.
95. See, e.g., R. LEE, Letter XVI, in AN ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF LETTERS
FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 142 (Quadrangle pub. 1962)
(New York 1788).
A free press is the channel of communication as to mercantile and public affairs; by means of it the people in large countries ascertain each others sentiments; are enabled to unite, and become formidable to those rulers who
adopt improper measures. Newspapers may sometimes be the vehicles of
abuse, and of many things not true; but these are but small inconveniences,
in my mind, among many advantages. A celebrated writer, I have" several
times quoted, speaking in high terms of the English liberties, says, "lastly
the key stone was put to the arch, by the final establishment of the freedom
of the press."
Id. at 152-53.
96. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 800 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
97. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. at 17 (Stewart, J.,concurring in judgment).
GANIC
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protects; nor is it to elevate the press clause to supremacy above
all other constitutional provisions. It simply means that claims of
the press to constitutional protection must be considered within
the context of the particularized protection that the words "or of
the press" are deemed to convey.
ON DEFINING "PRESS"

But who and what is the "press"? And is there not, as Chief
Justice Burger has urged, a danger that in the very act of articulating who is, and is not, deserving of press clause protection,
we will act in a manner "reminiscent of the abhorred licensing system of Tudor and Stuart England-a system the First Amendment
was intended to ban from this country."98 These are serious questions, but the first response that may be offered is that their import
is easily overstated.
In the great preponderance of cases, a court has little difficulty
knowing a journalist when it sees one. Indeed, in virtually every
first amendment press case in recent years, there has been no definitional difficulty at all. The New York Times, 99 the Nebraska Press
03
02
Association,' 00 Paul Branzburg, 101 the Miami Herald,' CBS,'
and others10 4 have surely been easily recognizable as "press." This
is not to say that yet another "lonely pamphleteer"' 0 5 will not find
his or her way to the Supreme Court, thus requiring a definitive
definition of "press"; it is suggestive that the genuine difficulty in
providing a totally satisfying definition should hardly deter us from
affording protection to those who are plainly entitled to it.
A useful analogy is to that other central spoke of the first
amendment: freedom of religion. Consider the paradox. It is plain
that "we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental interference with religion."' 10 6 Yet, despite
98.

First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 801 (Burger, C.J., concurring).

99. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
100. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).

101. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
102. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
103. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Herbert v.
Lando, 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979).

104. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420

U.S. 469 (1975); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
105.

Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).

106. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol7/iss3/2

18

1979]

JUSTICE STEWART AND THE AUTONOMOUS PRESS

Abrams: The Press Is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Au

the evident risks of governmental decisionmaking in this excruciatingly sensitive area, we permit judicial definition of what is and is
not a religion10 7 and which allegedly religious activities are and are
08
not constitutionally protected.'
Is this truly the "licensing" of religion? If so, we are led to the
bizarre conclusion that in the interest of protecting first amendment rights, we are precluded from enforcing any such rights. If
not, why should we be so much more squeamish about the press
clause? The fact remains that whatever the definitional difficulties
as to religion, it has never even been urged that they bar affording
constitutional protection to those who plainly fall within whatever
definition is chosen. In this context, it is difficult to comprehend
why the difficulties in defining "press" should lead to the conclusion that no uniquely "press" protections may be afforded.
Nor are the definitional difficulties insurmountable. Three approaches to defining "press" may be considered. One would be to
afford equivalent "press" protection to all who write, thus treating
the occasional pamphleteer precisely the same as the regularly employed journalist. Dictum in Branzburg v. Hayes'0 9 is supportive
of this approach."10
A second, narrower, approach is a functional one similar to
that taken by the Carter administration in proposed legislation to
reverse the Supreme Court's ruling in Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily."' Protection could be afforded not only to journalists on established newspapers but "to free-lance writers, radio and televi107. The constitutional issue has arisen, for example, in connection with the
prosecution of Mormons for bigamy, see Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161-64 (1878), and prosecutions of Jehovah's
Witnesses for proselytizing without a license, see, e.g., Borchert v. City of Ranger, 42
F. Supp. 577, 580 (N.D. Tex. 1941). The issue has arisen in a statutory context in
connection with conscientious-objector status. See Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d
377, 380-81 (9th Cir.),.cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946); United States v. Kauten, 133
F.2d 703, 707-08 (2d Cir. 1943). See also United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605,
633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting) (defining religion).
108. See Cleveland v. United States, 327 U.S. 14 (1964); Minersville School
Dist. v. Cobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946); United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d
Cir. 1943).
109. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
110. See id. at 704-05. Justice White, in his plurality opinion, approvingly
quoted the assertion in Lovell v. Griffin that " '[t]he press in its historic connotation
comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and
opinion.'" Id. at 704 (quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)).
111. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
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sion stations, magazines, academicians and any other person possessing materials in connection with the dissemination to the public
of a newspaper, book, broadcast or other form of communication. "12

The third, narrowest, definition might limit the entities protected by the press clause to what Justice Stewart refers to as the
"institutional press." Analogous support for-and examples of-this
definition may be found in the laws of most states that protect, by

statute, journalists from being required to disclose their confidential sources and information. 113 These statutes tend to focus on
such factors as the regularity of employment of the journalist and
the regularity of publication of the newspaper involved.114 These
definitions have worked tolerably well. While shield laws have
been judicially gutted with regularity, 11 it rarely has been for lack
112. Office of Media Liaison, White House Press Office, Carter Administration
Stanford Daily Announcement 3-4 (Dec. 13, 1978). On April 2, 1979, President
Carter formally announced the proposed legislation in the House and the Senate.
125 CONG. REC. H1866, S3771 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1979). "It [the legislation] will restrict police searches for documentary materials held by the press and by others involved in the dissemination of information to the public. With limited exceptions,
the bill will prohibit a search for or seizure of 'work product'-such as notes, interview files and film." Id. at H1867-68, S3772.
113. Twenty-six states currently have such laws. ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1977);
ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150-.220 (Supp. 1972); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237
(West Supp. 1957-1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070
(West 1966 & Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1975); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 51, §§ 111-119 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1
(Bums Supp. 1978); KY. REV. STAT. § 421.100 (1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
45:1451-:1454 (West Supp. 1978); MD. CTS. & JuD. PRoC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1974);
MICH. COMP. LAws § 767.5a (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.945(1) (Callaghan 1974));
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (West Supp. 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§
93-601-1 to -2 (1964 & Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147 (1977); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 49.275 (1977); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21, -21a, -29 (West 1976 &
Supp. 1979-1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw
§ 79-h (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1978-1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, .12 (Page 1954 & Supp. 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 2506 (West Supp. 1978-1979); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1977-1978);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Purdon Supp. 1978-1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1
to -3 (Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 24-113 to -115 (Supp. 1978).
114. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT.. ch. 51, § 112 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to -21a (West Supp. 1978-1979); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW §
79-h (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1978-1979). The Delaware statute, DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 4320 (1975), is noteworthy in that it protects not only journalists but also any
"scholar, educator, polemicist," or other person whose career involves "mass reproduction of words, sounds or images in a form available to the general public." Id.
115. The regularity with which shield laws have been overcome should gratify
the most demanding adherents of "neutral principles." The neutral principle, alas,
appears to be this: The press always loses. See, e.g., CBS v. Superior Court, 85 Cal.
App. 3d 241, 250, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421, 426 (1978) (California shield law, CAL. EVID.
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of knowledge about who or what was intended to be protected." 16
All three of these approaches are acceptable ones, although
none is without difficulty. The broader the class included within

the definition of press, the more attenuated the distinction between press and speech; the narrower the class, the greater the
risk of appearing to license some newspapers, but not all. For this
reason, the second approach seems a workable, if not flawless,
compromise. What is most important, however, is not the defini-

tion that is chosen; it is the recognition that the conceded definitional difficulty is hardly a basis for affording no press clause protection at all. In a legal world in which lawyers make tolerably
acceptable livings disputing what is and is not "unreasonable" re-

straint of trade or "unfair" competition, it is simply unacceptable to
say that because a word in the Constitution is difficult to define, it

should be afforded no meaning at all.
"PRESS" RIGHTS

VIS-A-VIS OTHERS

A discrete argument against Justice Stewart's view that the
press is entitled to constitutional protection distinct from that afforded by the speech clause is that by the very act of granting
"special" rights to the press, others deserving similar rights would
be deprived of them. Anthony Lewis, among others, has thus

CODE § 1070 (West 1966 & Supp. 1979), barring court order requiring dissemination of unpublished information held not to protect broadcaster against disclosure
of unpublished information "where, as here, the claimant of the privilege fails to explain what of substance in the materials sought to be produced has not already been
revealed"); Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971)
(California shield law held unconstitutional as interference with inherent power of
court to control its proceedings and officers), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972); In re
Investigative File, 4 MEDIA L. REP. 1865 (BNA) (1978) (Reporters' Confidence Act,
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-601-2 (Supp. 1977), held applicable to journalists
employed by Associated Press, but not to Associated Press itself); In re Farber, 78
N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330 (New Jersey shield law, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to
-21a (West Supp. 1978-1979), held obliged to "yield" to alleged sixth amendment right of defendant), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (App. Div.) (former New Jersey shield law held not to protect
journalist against revealing unpublished information where name of informant had
been published), cert. denied, 62 N.J. 80, 299 A.2d 78 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
991 (1973); In re Maryland Shield Law, 4 MEDIA L. REP. 1326 (BNA) (1978)
(Maryland Attorney General Opinion) (Journalists Shield Act, MD. CTS. JTJD. PROC.
CODE § 9-112 (1974), held not to protect unpublished material, in contradistinction
to New Jersey shield law, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 at -21a (West Supp.
1978-1979)).
116. But see People v. Le Grand, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 2, 1979, at 13, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.
Dec. 29, 1978) (New York book author held not entitled to statutory or constitutional
protection), aff'd, 67 A.D.2d 446, 415 N.Y.S.2d 252 (2d Dep't 1979).
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urged that granting the press the legal right not to respond to
questions seeking confidential sources might or would damage the
chances of academics to receive similar protection.'1 7 Yet, it is
largely because the press has achieved some degree of legal success
in seeking first amendment protection for its sources that a developing, analogous right of academics to protect their sources has begun to be recognized."18 Similarly, the recognition of some degree
of testimonial protection for journalists may yet be of some
help-and is, in any event, of no harm-to clergymen seeking similar protection beyond that afforded by the priest-penitent privi9
lege. 11
Here, as elsewhere in the law, judicial movement is interstitial
in nature. What is recognized as needed by the press in one case
may later be-and, in the case of scholars cited above, has already
been-recognized as needed by others. More broadly, there is no
reason to doubt that in most cases press and speech protections are
likely to be identical: When the government cannot stifle the
press, more often than not it will, for identical reasons, be barred
from stifling speech.
But not always. Some protections which are particularly
needed by the press are neither needed nor deserved by others.
Those who gossip over their back fences about public figures do
120
not require or deserve protection for their confidential sources;
117. Oral Statement by Anthony Lewis, William 0. Douglas Convocation,
Washington, D.C. (Dec. 8, 1978). See Lewis, supra note 67, at 607-09.
118. See, e.g., Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D.
388 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
119. See, e.g., Smilow v. United States, 465 F.2d 802 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded, 409 U.S. 944 (1972); In re Wood, 430 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
120. In Branzburg, the Court had before it an array of undisputed affidavits
from journalists setting forth the crucial role played in their profession by confidential sources and confidential information. Typical was the affidavit of Walter
Cronkite:
In doing my work, I (and those who assist me) depend constantly on information, ideas, leads and opinions received in confidence. Such material is
essential in digging out newsworthy facts and, equally important, in assessing the importance and analyzing the significance of public events.
Without such materials, I would be able to do little more than broadcast
press releases and public statements.
The material that I obtain in privacy and on a confidential basis is given
to me on that basis because my news sources have learned to trust me and
can confide in me without fear of exposure. In nearly every case, their position, perhaps their very job or career, would be in jeopardy if this were not
the case.
Brief amicus curiae, The New York Times Co. at 18-19, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972).
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nor do they require protection against intrusion into their nonexistent "editorial process."' 12 But this is hardly a basis for denying
such protections to the press.
Similarly, there is strong reason to question whether
Zurcher,12 2 which permits the use of search warrants (as opposed
to subpoenas) to obtain evidence from journalists and other innocent third parties, is at all as threatening to others as it is to the
press. For all but the press, Zurcher, probably unnecessarily, risks
invasion of significant privacy interests; 12 3 for the press itself,
Zurcher threatens not only privacy interests, but the very
ability-unique to the press-to serve as an independent check on
government power. 124 A sheriff, armed with the routinely issued
search warrant, can, by seizing confidential and other documents in
the possession of a newspaper, virtually destroy the paper's investigation of him, his associates, or his political party; 12 5 there is simply no apt and continuing analogy with respect to the documents of
others.
Another area that may lend itself to distinct treatment for the
press is libel cases commenced by private-figure plaintiffs. In Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 2 6 the Court permitted states to impose liability upon "a newspaper or broadcaster that publishes defamatory
falsehoods"' 2 7 about private figures, so long as they do not impose
"liability without fault."'128 As part of this newly struck balance, the
Court also held that presumed or punitive damages may not be
In Zurcher, as well, the Court was presented with a range of uncontradicted affidavits from journalists and editors concerning the effects on the journalistic process
of the searches at issue. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 573-74 & n.8 (Stewart,

J., dissenting). Whatever the correctness of either the Branzburg or Zurcher rulings,
there is simply no analagous argument that can be made to protect sources of back-

fence gossipers--or of many others.
121. For cases involving the "editorial process," see Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.

94, 124-25 (1973); Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 99 S.Ct.
1635 (1979).
122. In Zurcher, the Court refused to "forbid the states from issuing warrants to
search for evidence simply because the owner or possessor of the place to be
searched [was] not then reasonably suspected of criminal involvement." Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 560.

123.
124.
125.
GOODBYE
126.
127.
128.

See id. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See generally Blasi, supra note 45.
For a fictional account of a similar occurrence,
CALIFORNIA 83 (Fawcett pub. 1977).
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Id. at 332.
Id. at 347.
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awarded, "at least when liability is not based on a showing
of
29
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth."'

Since Gertz, lower courts have divided on whether the protection afforded "publishers or broadcasters"-the phrase repeatedly
used in one form or another throughout the opinion' 3 0-applies as
well to nonmedia defendants. Should such defendants be able to
avoid liability for articulating defamatory falsehoods about a private
person if the defamation was made "without fault"? 131 Should the
restriction on presumed damages against the press apply, as well,
to nonmedia defendants? 132 These are difficult questions, ones I
would be inclined to answer by affording similar treatment to media and nonmedia defendants. But the argument for distinct treatment for the press in this area is strong: It may be that only the
press requires the Gertz protections since its institutional viability
is at stake, and that for others the balance should be struck in favor
of the victims of defamatory falsehoods.
As is evident, I do not offer the above examples to demonstrate that the press must always receive broader protection than is
afforded others. What they do demonstrate is that the considerations that must be taken into account in determining whether and
when the press requires protection differ from those applied to

129. Id. at 349.
130. Id. at 348 ("publisher or broadcaster"); id. ("the press and broadcast media"); id. at 346 ("publisher or broadcaster"); id. at 343 ("needs of the press"); id. at
342 ("vigorous and uninhibited press"); id. at 341 ("the communications media"); id.
("publishers and broadcasters"); id. ("the news media"); id. at 332 ("newspaper or
broadcasters"); id. at 330 ("any publication or broadcast").
131. In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 99 S. Ct. 2675, 2687 n.16 (1979), the Supreme
Court noted that the issue of "whether the New York Times [v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964)] standard can apply to an individual defendant rather than a media defendant" has never been resolved. In Maryland it has been held that the Gertz
standard of proof of liability applies against a private defendant. Marchesi v.
Franchino, 283 Md. 131, 139, 387 A.2d 1129, 1133 (1978); Jacron Sales Co. v.
Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 594, 350 A.2d 688, 695 (1976). In Georgia, Oregon, and
Wisconsin it has been held otherwise. Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 234 Ga. 765,
767-68, 218 S.E.2d 54, 56-57 (1975); Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley,
279 Or. 361, 370-71, 568 P.2d 1359, 1365 (1977); Calero v. Del Chem. Corp., 68 Wis.
2d 487, 506, 228 N.W.2d 737, 747 (1975).
132. In Alabama, for example, it has been held that Gertz applies. Bryan v.
Brown, 339 So. 2d 577, 583-84 (Ala. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977). In
California, Colorado, and Oregon, it has been held that the restriction does not.
Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 932-35, 119 Cal. Rptr. 82, 85-87
(1975); Rowe v. Metz, 579 P.2d 83, 84-85 (Colo. 1978), rev'g 564 P.2d 425 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1977); Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 363-71, 568
P.2d 1359, 1361-65 (1977).
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others. In most cases, the first amendment compels the identical
result for press and nonpress. For example, Justice Stewart himself
joined (correctly, I believe) the majority opinion in First National
Bank v. Bellotti, 133 holding unconstitutional, on first amendment
grounds, limits imposed by Massachusetts on corporate speech.
Massachusetts urged that only the institutional press was entitled
to first amendment protection against such governmental limitations. Justice Powelrs majority opinion (joined by Justice Stewart)
responded by observing that: "The press cases emphasize the special and constitutionally recognized role of that institution in informing and educating the public, offering criticism, and providing
a forum for discussion and debate ....
But the press does not have
a monopoly on either the First Amendment or the ability to enlighten."'134 As Bellotti itself demonstrates, the conclusion that the
press has a "special and constitutionally recognized role" is hardly
inconsistent with the broadest grant of first amendment rights to
others-when those others are constitutionally deserving of them.
THE AUTONOMOUS PRESS

To say that the press clause provides distinct constitutional
protection for the press does not, of course, even begin to answer
the question of what the scope of this protection should be. In
cases involving the press, as I have suggested elsewhere, 135 the
Supreme Court has afforded virtually absolute protection to decisions regarding what should 36 or should not

37

be printed; press

protection has been considerable, although by no means absolute,
against punishment subsequent to publication; 3 8 least-although
139
some-protection has been afforded newsgathering.
Although basically consistent with t1his tri-parte breakdown,
Justice Stewart's opinions have increasingly emphasized its polar
extremities: Virtually total first amendment protection for the press
in the first two areas, and what Justice Stewart views as the allbut-total absence of distinct press rights in the third.14 0 It is a
133. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
134. Id. at 781-82 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
135. See Abrams, Book Review, 86 YALE L.J. 361, 366-67 (1976).
136. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
137. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
138. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
139. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978); Pell
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
140. Compare Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. at 19 (Stewart, J., concurring in
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fascinating equation which raises the fundamental issue of whether
there need be any equation at all. Why should the press not be
able to gather all that it is permitted to print? Why should it be
permitted to print what it is not constitutionally entitled to gather?
One eloquent answer was provided by Alexander Bickel:
[G]overnment may guard mightily against serious but more ordinary leaks, and yet must suffer them if they occur. Members of
Congress as well as the press may publish materials that the government wishes to, and is entitled to, keep private. It is a disorderly situation surely. But if we ordered it we would have to
sacrifice one of two contending values-privacy or public
discourse-which are ultimately irreconcilable. If we should let
the government censor as well as withhold, that would be too
much dangerous power, and too much privacy. If we should allow the government neither to censor nor to withhold, that
would provide for too little privacy of decision-making and too
much power in the press and in Congress. 141
The acceptance of constitutional "disorder" also seems a practical necessity if the press is to continue to be granted all but total
power to determine what to print. The Pentagon Papers Case is a
fitting example: Justices White and Stewart stated in a concurring
opinion that they were "confident" that publication of all the materials obtained by the press in that case would likely do "substantial
damage to public interests"; i 4 2 another member of the Court was
even harsher in his comments; 14 3 and others as well seemed
unpersuaded that the documents would have no harmful effect on
American foreign policy.' 4 Yet the approach of all the members of
the Court was that the prior restraint challenged in the case was
presumptively unconstitutional, 45 and the six-to-three majority
held in favor of the newspapers against whom proceedings had
judgment), with Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. at 849
(Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart's apparent view that there is no first amendment right of the press to gather news unless the general public has been itself afforded some newsgathering right is not supported by either the majority opinion in
Branzburg-which observed that "without some protection for seeking out the news,
freedom of the press could be eviscerated," 408 U.S. at 681-or by Justice Stewart's
Branzburg dissent, id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
141. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 80 (1975).
142. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 731 (White, J., concurring, joined by Stewart, J.).
143. Id. at 762-63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 758 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.).
145. See generally Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 558-59; Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. at 395 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
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been commenced.' 4 6 If the situation were more "ordered," it
hardly seems conceivable that the classified information could have
been published.
The Landmark case 4 7 is another useful example. Confidential
proceedings of the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission relating to the fitness of a juvenile-court judge were made
known to a Virginia newspaper which identified the judge in a
news article. The newspaper was convicted under a Virginia statute
making it a crime to disseminate the name of the judge. The Commonwealth defended the statute on the ground, inter alia, that:
It benefits no one to say that the State can determine that
certain matters of public interest should be kept confidential,
but that the press is free to use whatever means it chooses to
discover that information and to print what it learns. That kind
of trial by battle and cleaverness [sic] between the State and the
press hardly seems the way best to further the various aims of a
democratic society.148
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, not
only reversed the conviction, but held that "the publication
Virginia seeks to punish . . . lies near the core of the first amendment.' 149 Again, it seems most unlikely that any member of the
Court would have held that the press has any "right" to the information; the only right is to publish it once it is learned.
There is no doubt that any such system is an intellectually
untidy one. 150 The result may be viewed as anomolous, but nonetheless necessary: much information that the press does not learn
and from which the public would profit will not be disclosed; some
information that the press does learn and from which the public
146. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 714.
147. See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
148. Brief for Appellee at 18, Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435
U.S. 829 (1978) (footnote omitted).
149. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. at 838. See also
Smith v. Daily Mail Co., 99 S. Ct. 2267 (1979).
150. In oral argument in Landmark, the following colloquy occurred between
Assistant Attorney General Kulp, representing the Commonwealth, and Justice
Rehnquist:
MR. KULP: I say, as I point out in my brief, I think it's a very untidy
way for us to be trying to run a democratic society [for the press and government] to be competing one with another on information of that nature....
QUESTION [Justice Rehnquist]: The press doesn't believe in tidiness,
does it?
MR. KULP: No sir. I would have to concede that I don't believe they do.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435
U.S. 829 (1978).
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would not profit will be disclosed. But the alternative is a grim
one: "We have learned," Justice White has warned, "and continue
to learn, from what we view as the unhappy experiences of other
nations where government has been allowed to meddle in the internal editorial affairs of newspapers."'15 '
There remains the argument that the first amendment should
be held to require that acts of government must be open. In certain cases, such as those involving access to the courts, the argument is a powerful one, 152 although no particular "press" rights
need be vindicated to assure a public right of access to the judicial
system. In other cases, such as those involving access to prisons,
the argument is strong that the first amendment should at least require sonie public access in the absence of strong countervailing
public interests, 153 but, again, there appears to be no need for special press rights, apart from that resulting from there being insufficient room to accommodate all who wish to inspect a prison. In
this area, it appears that Justice Stewart is of the view that so long
as neither the public nor the press has any right of access, the first
amendment rights of neither are violated.'54 As the opinions of
Justices Powell and Stevens in the prison-access cases suggest, this
seems, at the very least, a constricted view of the nonpress clause
first amendment rights of the public.' 55
But insofar as any unique rights of the press are concerned, the
151. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. at 259 (White, J., concurring). The scope of the appalling limitations on press freedom throughout the
world requires no elaboration. Even in England, the press was unable, consistent
with English contempt law-and over fifteen years after the event-to publish truthful information in its possession about the sale of thalidomide that resulted in the
births of eight thousand deformed babies. Under English law, since the actions
brought by parents of these children remained sub judice, the Sunday Times of
London was barred from publishing information as to the culpability of drug manufacturers. See P.
CMLDREN

KNIGHTLEY,

H. EVANS, E. POTTER & M.

WALLACE,

SUFFER THE

(1979).

152. This argument is also premised on the sixth amendment. See United
States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1978); Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43
N.Y.2d 370, 382, 372 N.E.2d 544, 551, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 763 (1977) (Cooke, J., dissenting), affd, 99 S.Ct. 2898 (1979). For a discussion of Gannett, see note 162 infra.
153. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. at 35-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Saxbe
v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 850 (Powell, J., dissenting); Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. at 835 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

154.
ment).
155.

Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgSee id. (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); Saxbe v. Washington Post

Co., 417 U.S. at 850 (Powell, J., dissenting); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 835
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stewart's Landmark
concurrence, as well, affords extremely-and unpersuasively-narrow protection to
free expression rights of others than the press. See 435 U.S. at 848 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
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balance struck by Justice Stewart seems the correct one. A press
that continually applies to the courts for vindication of its right to
gather information cannot credibly be the same press that tells the
same courts that what the press prints and why it prints it are not
matters that courts may even consider. When Professor Bickel,
representing the New York Times in the Pentagon Papers Case,
was asked by District Court Judge Gurfein "what good" it would
do the public to read in the New York Times in 1971 what the
American Ambassador in the Soviet Union had thought in 1968, he
could-and did-respond by saying, "I think, your Honor, the
1 5 6 It
First Amendment forecloses [you] from asking that question."
was a rare moment, a response both bold and brave. Yet, had the
Times, a week earlier, attempted to demonstrate the "good" served
by judicial enforcement of access to other news, Bickers answer
could hardly have been a credible one. A press that vindicates the
public's "right to know," not by its own independent newsgathering, but by appeals for judicial or legislative consent, is hardly
likely to be able through the years to defend the proposition that
the first amendment "is a clear command that government must
never be allowed to lay its heavy editorial hand on any newspaper
' 57
in this country."'

THE ROLE OF THE PRESS
In the end, any decision as to whether the press should be afforded distinct constitutional protection is less dependent upon any
particular interpretation of the press clause of the first amendment
than on one's perception of the role of the press in American life.
Metaphors are useful in defining that role. The press is often likened to a watchdog guarding against abuse of governmental
power. 158 De Tocqueville, in turn, likened the press to an "eye
. . .constantly open to detect the secret springs of political designs and to summon the leaders of all parties in turn to the bar of
public opinion."' 59
156. In Camera Proceedings at 142, United States v. New York Times Co., 328
F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y.), remanded, 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 403
U.S. 713 (1971).
157. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
at 403-04 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See generally Goodale, Legal Pitfalls in the Right
to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 29.
158. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560 (1976); Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-96 (1975); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
159. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 187 (Alfred A. Knopf
pub. 1966).
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If, as I would urge, these metaphors are apt, it is hardly because the press invariably serves as a vigilant protector of the public from its government; few newspaper readers would recognize
such a magical transformation of the too often bland products
thrust upon their doorsteps. On the contrary, it is because the
press is the only institution that can serve on a continuing basis as
an open eye of the public-and because, now and again, the press
plays precisely this role.
To a considerable degree, the first amendment is bottomed on
a "worst case" scenario-more particularly, a worst government
case scenario. The scenario includes visages of government officials
acting weakly and foolishly-sometimes corruptly and wickedly; it
assumes a press ready to "bare the secrets of government and inform the people."' 60 As such, it is fortunately exaggerated as a
statement of common behavior, since the government is hardly so
consistently venal or the press so consistently able. But the scenario has all happened, all too recently. And there is no reason to
assume it will not happen again.
It is thus crucial that the roles of the players in the scenario
be clear ones. "Your job," Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote
to James Reston, "requires you to pry, and mine requires me to
keep secret."161 Acheson was right. At the core of Justice Stewart's
view of the first amendment is the telling concept that both
Acheson and Reston served society best when they performed their
separate and ultimately autonomous functions.' 62
160. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 717 (Black, J., concurring).
161. J. HOHENBERG, supra note 64, at 47 (quoting letter from Dean Acheson to
James Reston (Jan. 1953), recounted in letter from Dean Acheson to John Hohenberg
(Apr. 6, 1965)). See also id. at 149 for similar comments by Secretary of State Dean
Rusk.
162. Subsequent to the completion of this Article, Justice Stewart wrote the
opinion for the Supreme Court in Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979),
holding that the sixth amendment does not afford the public the right to attend
pretrial hearings when both the defendant and prosecutor have agreed to their
closing. Although Justice Stewart's opinion for the closely divided court was bottomed on the sixth amendment-and, as such, heartily and generally successfully assaulted in Justice Blackmun's spirited dissent, id. at 2919 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)-its first amendment emanations are troubling. Assuming, arguendo, some first and fourteenth amendment right to attend trials, Justice
Stewart's opinion held that they were given adequate recognition since the trial
court, after a hearing, had balanced first amendment interests against the defendant's
right to fair trial, and since a transcript of the suppression hearing was later made
available. Yet on the facts of the Gannett case, the balance struck by the trial judge
is difficult to defend: prior publication by the newspapers had been, in Justice
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Blackmun's words, "placid, routine and innocuous," as well as "comparative[ly] infrequen[t]." Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Moreover,
any such totally ad hoc balancing test offers trial courts no guidelines as to how to
assess and weigh competing first and sixth amendment claims: Under such circumstances, the already evident tendency of trial courts to "balance" in favor of their
own turf by routinely closing courtrooms was all too predictable. See N.Y. Times,
Aug. 4, 1979, at Al, col. 5. Less defensible still is the proposition that distribution of
after-the-fact transcripts comes close to being an adequate substitute for contemporaneous scrutiny of judicial behavior. As any trial lawyer would confirm, such a proposition is something only an appellate judge could believe.
Given all that, Justice Stewart's Gannett opinion remains basically consistent
with his earlier opinions rejecting claims of access by both the press and the public
and should, as this Article indicates, come as no surprise. Nonetheless, one may, perhaps, be forgiven the wistful hope that some day some of Justice Stewart's majority
opinions with respect to the press will be transformed into dissents; and-more
important-that more of his dissents and concurrences will become opinions of the
Court. Then, at least, counsel will know how to respond to the questions posed at
the commencement of this Article---and the answers will be glowing ones.
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